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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
FREED LEASING, INC., 
Plaint i ff/Respondent, 
-vs-
DEBRA K. COMPTON and 
EDWIN COMPTON, 
Defendants/Appellants 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Case No. 87-0216 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
Appellate jurisdiction of this Court is appropriate and 
conferred under Section 78-2-2 Utah Code Ann. as an appeal from a 
final judgment of the District Court for which original appellate 
jurisdiction is not conferred upon the Court of Appeals. This is 
an appeal from a final judgment of the Second District Court of 
Davis County, State of Utah, the Honorable Judge Rodney S. Page. 
ISSUES PRESENTED BY APPEAL 
Issue Number One: Is the judgment in favor of Debra 
Compton entitling her to recover exempt homestead sale proceeds 
2 
subject to setoff against a prior judgment against Debra Compton 
in favor of Plaintiff on an unsecured debt? 
Issue Number Two: Are Defendants or either of them 
entitled to recover reasonable attorney's fees under Section 78-
23-13 U.C.A. (permits a Court to award reasonable attorney's fees 
for a violation of Chapter 23, the Utah Exemptions Act) or is 
recovery available only under circumstances involving wrongful 
execution? 
Issue Number Three; Are Defendants or either of them 
entitled to recover reasonable attorney's fees under Section 78-
27-56 U.C.A. (permits the Court to award reasonable attorney's 
fees where an action or defense is without merit and not brought 
or asserted in good faith). 
DETERMINATIVE UTAH STATUTES 
A. Utah Exemptions Act, Section 78-23-3(5) U.C.A. 
provides as follows: 
(5) When a homestead is conveyed by the 
owner of the property the conveyance shall 
not subject the property to any lien to 
which it would not be subject in the hands 
of the owner; and the proceeds of any sale, 
to the amount of the exemption existing at 
the time of sale, shall be exempt from levy, 
execution, or other process for one year 
after the receipt of the proceeds by the 
person entitled to the exemption. 
B. Utah Exemptions Act, Section 78-23-13 U.C.A. provides 
as follows: 
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An individual or the spouse of a dependent 
of the individual is entitled to injunctive 
relief, damages, or both, against a creditor 
or other person to prevent or redress a 
violation of this chapter. A court may 
award costs and reasonable attorney's fees 
to a party entitled to injunctive relief or 
damages. 
C. Judicial Code Section 78-27-56 U.C.A. provides as 
follows: 
In civil actions, where not otherwise 
provided by statute or agreement, the court 
may award reasonable attorney!s fees to a 
prevailing party if the court determines 
that the action or defense to the action was 
without merit and not brought or asserted in 
good faith. 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff Freed Leasing commenced this action in the 
Second District Court of Davis County seeking to set aside a quit 
claim deed conveyance by Debra Compton to her husband, Edwin 
Compton, of her one-half interest in the family home and further 
seeking to subject the home to Freed's judgment against Debra 
Compton obtained in an action filed in the Third District Court 
of Salt Lake County, State of Utah. Prior to the time this 
action was commenced by Freed Leasing, the Comptons had arranged 
for a sale of their family home and an escrow closing of the sale 
was already pending. At the time the title company was to 
complete the closing, it discovered the presence of Freed 
LeasingTs notice of lien claiming that it had a judgment lien 
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against the interest of Debra Compton in the family home. 
Thereafter, following discussions between counsel for Freed 
Leasing and counsel for the Comptons, Freed Leasing insisted on 
receiving the entirety of the homeTs net sale proceeds as a 
condition to releasing its Notice of Lien. Debra Compton 
thereupon recorded a homestead declaration, and following its 
recordation instructed the title company to pay over the entire 
sale proceeds to Freed Leasing in order to close the sale of the 
family home. Shortly after paying over such proceeds, Comptons 
filed an answer and counterclaim against Freed Leasing seeking to 
recover back the monies paid to Freed Leasing from the closing 
and further seeking to recover reasonable attorneyfs fees 
incurred in the action. 
DISPOSITION IN COURT BELOW 
The matter was submitted to the trial court on stipulated 
facts with oral argument made by counsel for the parties. The 
Court concluded that Edwin Compton was the owner of a one-half 
interest in the home, was not at any time subject to the judgment 
or judgment lien in favor of Plaintiff, and was entitled to 
recover from Plaintiff one-half of the sale proceeds, together 
with interest at the implied rate, and judgment was granted in 
favor of Edwin Compton accordingly. The Court concluded that 
Debra Compton had been the owner of a one-half interest in the 
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home at all times up to the sale to the Joneses, that her prior 
purported transfer to her husband Edwin was a fraudulent 
conveyance and should be set aside and ignored, but that her one-
half of the sale proceeds were exempted by the Homestead 
Declaration, and she was entitled to judgment against Plaintiff 
for the one-half of the homestead exempt proceeds, together with 
interest to the date of trial. However, the Court concluded that 
Debra Compton!s judgment was subject to setoff against 
Plaintifffs prior judgment and she was not entitled to recover 
any proceeds back from Plaintiff. The trial court further 
concluded that Defendants were not entitled to recover an award 
of attorney's fees under Section 78-23-13 U.C.A. since such 
section only permits an award of attorney's fees for wrongful 
execution and were not entitled to recover attorney's fees under 
Section 78-27-56 U.C.A. since Plaintiff's action or the defense 
of the action by Plaintiff was not without merit. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appended hereto for the convenience of the Court is a 
certified copy of the Stipulation of Facts, together with the 
Exhibits that were originally appended thereto. The Davis County 
Clerk's office inadvertantly transmitted the record of this case 
to the Clerk of the Utah Supreme Court without page number 
references, making it impossible to refer to specific pages of 
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the record to support the statement of facts. In view of the 
circumstances and the fact that counsel for both Plaintiff and 
Defendants agreed to and submitted the Stipulation of Facts to 
the trial court, for the purposes of the following facts, 
reference is made to the appended Stipulation of Facts in support 
thereof. Based on the foregoing, the statement of facts is as 
follows: 
1. Defendants Debra and Edwin Compton were husband and 
wife and the owners as joint tenants of a home situated in Davis 
County, State of Utah. 
2. In April of 1984, in an action filed in Salt Lake 
County, Plaintiff Freed Leasing recovered for the balance owed on 
an auto lease by judgment against Defendant Debra Compton in the 
approximate amount of $8900.00. 
3. In June of 1984, Debra Compton transferred her 
interest in the home to her husband by signing and recording a 
qui t claim deed. 
4. After the recording of the quit claim deed, Edwin and 
Debra Compton and their minor child continued to reside in the 
home. The purported transfer by Debra to her husband Edwin 
constituted a "fraudulent conveyance" within the meaning of Title 
25 of the Utah Code. 
5. In July of 1984, Edwin Compton entered into an 
agreement to sell the home to individuals named "Jones" for the 
price of $122,000.00. The sale was negotiated in an arms length 
transaction and the sales price represented the fair market value 
of the home. The home was encumbered by first and second trust 
deed lien obligations with an aggregate balance in excess of 
$120,000.00. 
6. In contemplation of the closing of the sale of the 
home, the Comptons moved all of their personal property and 
household furnishings out of the home and permitted the Joneses 
to enter into possession. 
7. On August 1, 1987, a closing took place between Edwin 
Compton and the Jonses at Associated Title Company and all 
documents were executed and the warranty deed was signed by Edwin 
Compton and deposited in escrow with the title company. The same 
day, when the title company attempted to record the documents 
with the Davis County Recorder, they discovered Plaintiff's 
"Notice of Lien" referencing this action against both Debra and 
Edwin Compton. The title company immediately advised the Comptons 
and Joneses that the notice of lien rendered the title to the 
home unmarketable and the sale could not be completed. 
8. On August 3, 1984, counsel for Compton's informed 
Plaintiff's attorney that Edwin Compton would receive only 
$1517.00 in total net sale proceeds from the home and that 
Defendant Debra Compton was entitled to and did claim a homestead 
exemption in the home of $10,500.00. Plaintiff's attorney was 
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also given a copy of the proposed Homestead Declaration and the 
actual buyer's and seller's closing statements signed by the 
parties at the prior closing. 
9. On August 6, 1984, counsel for the parties 
participated in a conversation with an officer of the title 
company for the purpose of authenticating the closing statements 
and verifying the amount of net sale proceeds to be received by 
the Comptons. During the conversation, the title officer advised 
Plaintiff's counsel that the net proceeds of $1517.00 was based 
on an agreement by one of the mortgage holders to discount its 
payoff balance by approximately $8000.00. 
10. Counsel was also advised that if the closing was 
delayed further by reason of the notice of lien, the holder would 
no longer accept the discounted balance and the sale could not be 
completed, causing damage to Edwin Compton, as well as to the 
Joneses who were occupying the home and who had no notice or 
prior knowledge of any purported claim of Plaintiff to a lien on 
the home. 
11. In the same discussion and in ensuing discussions, 
Plaintiff's counsel offered to hold the entire net sale proceeds 
of $1517.00 in escrow to preserve and protect Plaintiff's claim 
until the Court could make a determination of the rights and 
interests of the parties. Plaintiff's counsel refused. 
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12. In an ensuing telephone conversation, Defendants1 
counsel tendered to Plaintiff one-half of the net sale proceeds 
(the amount that would have belonged to Defendant Debra Compton), 
but Plaintiff's counsel again refused, though he acknowledged 
that Edwin Compton was, at all times since the purchase of the 
home, at least a one-half owner of the home and was not obligated 
on Plaintiff's prior judgment. 
13. Finally, on August 9, 1984, the title company 
received a letter from Plaintiff stating that upon receiving the 
entire net sale proceeds from the home of $1517.00, Plaintiff 
would give the title company a release of lien and indemnify them 
respecting the lien. On the same day, Debra Compton recorded the 
declaration of homestead claiming a total exemption of $10,500.00 
in the home and instructed the title company to record the 
warranty deed to the Joneses and to release the sale proceeds to 
Plaintiff. 
14. The warranty deed was recorded on August 10, 1984, 
following the recordation of the Declaration of Homestead and the 
$1517.00 was paid by the title company to Plaintiff. Thereafter, 
on August 29, 1985, Defendants1 answered Plaintiff's complaint 
and counterclaimed against Plaintiff seeking to recover back the 
entire sale proceeds, interest thereon and attorneyfs fees. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
POINT ONE 
Section 78-23-3(5) U.C.A. (the "Utah Exemptions Act") 
specifically states with reference to a homestead exemption that 
the exempt interest and the proceeds from the sale thereof are 
exempt from levy, execution or other process for one year after 
the receipt of the proceeds by the person entitled to the 
exemption. Debra Compton, having been required to instruct the 
title company under protest to pay over the entirety of her 
exempt proceeds to Freed Leasing in order to facilitate and 
complete the closing of the sale of the home to a third party 
purchaser, and having been required to maintain the counterclaim 
in this action seeking to recover back such exempt proceeds, 
cannot be deemed to have had receipt of the exempt proceeds for 
the required minimum period of one year, and therefore such 
proceeds, upon recovery, are not subject to setoff for at least 
the one year period that Debra Compton is entitled to retain the 
proceeds by statute. 
POINT TWO 
Section 78-23-13 U.C.A. (the "Utah Exemptions Act") 
permits the Court to award costs and reasonable attorneyTs fees 
for an individual or a spouse or dependent of an individual 
entitled to injunctive relief or damages or both against a 
creditor to prevent or redress a violation of the chapter. Freed 
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Leasing violated Section 78-23-3(2) and (5) U.C.A. (which exempts 
the homestead interest from a judicial lien and from levy, 
execution or forced sale, and the exempt proceeds resulting from 
the sale for a period of one year) when Freed Leasing insisted on 
taking the entirety of the sale proceeds while knowing that the 
proceeds belonging to Debra Compton were totally exempt sale 
proceeds, and by refusing at all times to return such sale 
proceeds during the pendency of Debra ComptonTs action seeking to 
recover back such exempt sale proceeds. 
POINT THREE 
Section 78-27-56 U.C.A. permits the Court to award 
reasonable attorney's fees to the prevailing party where the 
action or defense to the action was without merit and not brought 
or asserted in good faith. In this case, Freed Leasing knew from 
the outset that there was no basis for its taking one-half of the 
home sale proceeds which belonged to Edwin Compton, since Edwin 
Compton was not at any time subject to Freed Leasing's prior 
judgment against Debra Compton. Nonetheless, Freed Leasing 
continued its refusal to return one-half of the sale proceeds to 
Edwin Compton until ordered to do so after the trial of this 
matter, and from the outset and during the entire pendency of 
this action, Plaintiff had no honest belief in the propriety of 
the activities in question, and attempted to take an 
unconscionable advantage of Edwin Compton respecting his rightful 
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claim to $758.50 (one-half of the total sale proceeds). Under 
such circumstances an award of attorneyTs fees is appropriate. 
POINT ONE: DEFENDANT DEBRA COMPTONTS JUDGMENT TO RECOVER 
EXEMPT HOMESTEAD SALE PROCEEDS IS NOT SUBJECT TO SETOFF. 
The trial court properly concluded at the time of trial 
of this matter that Debra Compton having recorded a Declaration 
of Homestead prior to the recording of the warranty deed to the 
purchasers of her home , perfected her homestead exemption in the 
proceeds from such sale. 
Section 78-23-3(5) provides as follows: 
When a homestead is conveyed by an owner 
of the property the conveyance shall not 
subject the property to any lien to which 
it would not be subject in the hands of 
the owner; and the proceeds of any sale, 
to the amount of the exemption existing at 
the time of sale, shall be exempt from 
levy, execution, or other process for one 
year after the receipt of the proceeds by 
the person entitled to the exemption. 
(Emphasis Added) 
Debra Compton never received the exempt proceeds, which 
from the time of the sale even to this late date, remain in the 
hands of Plaintiff. Immediately after Plaintiff received 
DebraTs exempt sale proceeds, Debra filed a counterclaim and 
asserted her right to recover such proceeds, which Plaintiff 
resisted and claimed was subject to setoff. Under these 
circumstances, the Court must determine when the one year 
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period of time begins to run and ends with respect to the 
exempt sale proceeds. This would be a more difficult question 
of interpretation if the statute merely said, "... for a period 
of one year from the time of sale,". However, the statute is 
much more clear; it states specifically that the 
proceeds are exempt for one year "after the receipt" by the 
person entitled to the homestead exemption. 
A review of the definitions under 78-23-2 U.C.A. should 
resolve any doubts as to when the one year period should 
commence running and whether or not there could be any 
interruption in the one year period. Subsection (4) defines 
"judicial lien" as a lien on property obtained by judgment or 
other legal process instituted for the purpose of collecting an 
unsecured debt. Subsection (5) defines "levy" as the seizure 
of property pursuant to any legal process issued for the 
purpose of collecting an unsecured debt. Subsection (3) 
defines "exempt" to mean "protected" and "exemption" to mean 
"protection from subjection to a judicial process to collect an 
unsecured debt." Since 78-23-3(2) U.C.A. makes a homestead 
exempt from judicial lien and subsection (5) makes the proceeds 
exempt from levy, execution or other process for one year after 
the receipt by the homestead owner, the proceeds must be in 
Debra ComptonTs hands for the full one year period after her 
receipt. 
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If this is not the correct interpretation, then a 
result most contradictory to the statutes could occur. Assume 
the following hypothetical facts: 
Debra Compton had filed her homestead 
declaration as she did and actually received 
the approximately $800.00 in exempt proceeds 
immediately following the sale. Thereafter, 
approximately six months later, Plaintiff, 
having a judgment against Debra Compton, 
issues a writ of garnishment which is served 
upon the bank where such exempt proceeds are 
deposited. The bank, complying with the 
lawful writ of garnishment, either holds 
such proceeds as a result of Defendant's 
claim that they are exempt or pays them to 
Plaintiff over her objection as lawfully 
permitted under the writ. Suppose further, 
as in the case here, Debra sues to recover 
the exempt proceeds and points out to the 
judgment creditor that they came from the 
sale of her homestead property. 
Nonetheless, the judgment creditor still 
refuses to instruct the bank to return the 
funds or alternatively refuses to return the 
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funds itself, thereby depriving the person 
owning the exempt proceeds from their use or 
benefit or from reinvesting them in another 
homestead as permitted under 78-23-3(7) 
U.C.A. 
In the hypothetical, it would surely be conceivable, 
and in fact very likely, that such litigation over the exempt 
proceeds could ensue for more than six months before a 
determination of the claims of the parties could be made at 
trial. If the lower court's statutory interpretation is 
correct, then the judgment creditor need only continue it's 
refusal to return the funds to the homestead claimant until the 
one year period has elapsed, and thereupon the judgment 
creditor would have succeeded in making the funds subject to 
setoff and would have no further obligation to return the funds 
to the homestead claimant. The result would permit the 
judgment creditor to retain exempt proceeds for its benefit, 
which it had no right to obtain in the first instance, so long 
as it could successfully hold the money or tie up the money 
until the expiration of the one year period. This surely 
cannot be the correct conclusion or statutory interpretation, 
since it violates both the intention and spirit of the 
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constitutional homestead exemption and the express terms of the 
statutes implementing the same. 
Debra Compton, having not received the proceeds at the 
time of sale of her homestead interest, and having not recieved 
them back at any time after she filed her counterclaim and 
continued with this action to recover such proceeds from 
Plaintiff; cannot now be deprived of having those proceeds for 
a period of one year from her receipt by making them subject to 
setoff in favor of Plaintiff. 
POINT TWO: DEFENDANTS ARE ENTITLED TO RECOVER THEIR 
REASONABLE ATTORNEYS FEES PURSUANT TO 78-23-13 U.C.A. , AND THE 
COURT ERRED IN CONSTRUING THIS SECTION AS BEING APPLICABLE ONLY 
TO WRONGFUL EXECUTION. 
Section 78-23-13 U.C.A. states the following: 
An individual or the spouse or a dependent 
of the individual is entitled to injunctive 
relief, damages, or both, against a creditor 
or other person to prevent or redress a 
violation of this chapter. A court may 
award costs and reasonable attorney's fees 
to a party entitled to injunctive relief or 
damages. 
Chapter 23, "Utah Exemptions Act", doesnTt just prohibit 
execution upon a real property interest consisting of an exempt 
homestead, but also prohibits levy or other process to obtain 
exempt sale proceeds. Section 78-23-3(2) exempts the homestead 
property from judicial lien, levy, execution or forced sale, and 
Section 78-23-3(5) provides that when a homestead is conveyed by 
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the owner that the proceeds of the sale, up to the amount of 
exemption that existed at the time of the sale, shall be exempt 
from levy, execution or other process for one year after the 
receipt by the homestead owner. Since "levy" is defined in 
Section 78-23-2(5) as "the seizure of property pursuant to any 
legal process issued for the purpose of collecting an unsecured 
debt" there appears to be no basis whatsoever for the trial 
court's unreasonably narrow and erroneous interpretation limiting 
an award of attorneyfs fees under the statute to circumstances 
where wrongful execution has occurred. 
It is a well standing rule of statutory construction that 
remedial statutes are to be liberally construed. The homestead 
exemption statutes having been constitutionally mandated are 
certainly no exception to this rule and in fact, to the contrary, 
are the epitomy of this rule. See Utah Builders Supply Company v 
Gardner, 42 P.2d 989 (Utah 1935); Sanders v Cassity, 586 P.2d 423 
(Utah 1978). 
Our case is very similar to the hypothetical posed in 
Point I. above where the holder of homestead exempt proceeds on 
deposit with the bank has them taken by a writ of garnishment for 
a judgment debt. Such garnishment is improper since the proceeds 
are exempt and are not subject to levy or other process to 
collect upon a judicial lien. This is not to say that the 
judgment creditor did anything wrong or had any evil intent or 
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purpose at the time the writ of garnishment was issued and the 
proceeds were seized pursuant thereto. The judgment creditor may 
have been attempting in good faith to collect a proper judgment 
debt that was due and owing to it. However, if the judgment 
creditor, after being advised of the circumstances and facts and 
afforded the opportunity to reasonably verify the same, still 
refuses to return such proceeds, then surely the statute, being 
remedial in nature, was intended to redress this problem by 
permitting the Court to award attorneyfs fees. 
The appropriateness or desirability for an award of 
attorney's fees in favor of the homestead claimant should be 
viewed relative to the amount of exemption set forth in the 
statute, namely $8000.00 for the head of family, $2000.00 for the 
spouse, and $500.00 for each dependent child. These amounts 
which are the maximum exempted for the benefit of the family's 
interest in the homestead or homestead proceeds are small 
compared to the high cost of litigation in our society. The 
proceeds usually in controversy with a creditor would customarily 
be less than the maximum. If the Court interprets the statute 
narrowly and does not try to further its remedial purpose by 
awarding attorney's fees for the benefit of the homestead 
claimant, then surely the whole purpose will be emasculated. The 
claimant can rarely afford the cost of litigating and would be 
subject to the will, intimidation and overpowering of the 
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creditor who will usually have greater financial resources and 
better be able to withstand the cost of litigation to a final 
conclusion. 
The legislature seemed to have recognized this problem 
and expressed its conscience by enacting in 1981 the remedial 
statute providing for an award of attorney's fees. It is also 
worth noting that it was in the same legislative session, 1981, 
that the legislature enacted Section 78-27-56 U.C.A. permitting 
the Court to award attorney's fees to the prevailing party when 
the Court determined that the action or "defense to the action" 
was wi thout mer i t. 
POINT THREE: DEFENDANTS ARE ENTITLED TO RECOVER THEIR 
REASONABLE ATTORNEY'S FEES PURSUANT TO SECTION 78-27-56 U.C.A. 
Section 78-27-56 U.C.A. permits the Court in civil 
actions "where not otherwise provided by statute or agreement" to 
award reasonable attorney's fees to the prevailing party if the 
action or defense to the action was without merit and not brought 
or asserted in good faith. While Appellants contend that an 
award of attorney's fees is more properly supported under Section 
78-23-13 U.C.A., nonetheless, an award would be appropriate under 
Section 78-27-56 U.C.A. as well. 
The Utah Supreme Court in Cady v Johnson, 671 P.2d 149 
(Utah 1983) held that two requirements had to be met before an 
award of attorney's fees under the statute would be 
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appropriate. The first was a finding that the action or defense 
being brought or maintained was "without merit." The term was 
equated to frivolous, and in Cady was further equated to no legal 
basis for recovery. In this case, particularly as to Edwin 
Compton, Plaintiff knew that there was no basis for taking his 
one-half of the sale proceeds from the home since he was not 
subject to PlaintiffTs judgment at any time. 
The second requirement is that the conduct in maintaining 
the defense be lacking in good faith. The Supreme Court equated 
this to establishing that Plaintiff either: (1) had no honest 
belief in the propriety of the activities in question; or (2) 
attempted to take unconscionable advantage of others; or (3) 
attempted to or had knowledge of the fact that the activities in 
question would hinder, delay or defraud others. 
In this case, from the outset, Plaintiff knew and 
admitted (see Stipulation of Facts) that Edwin Compton was the 
owner of one-half of the proceeds and was not a judgment debtor 
and was entitled to have those proceeds paid to him upon the sale 
of the family home. Notwithstanding Plaintiff's counsel's 
acknowledgement of this fact, and further notwithstanding that 
Defendant's counsel proposed to hold the entire proceeds in 
escrow to protect Plaintiff or alternatively proposed to pay 
Plaintiff one-half of the proceeds that would have belonged to 
Debra Compton; nevertheless, Plaintiff insisted on receiving the 
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entire sale proceeds and accomplished this purpose over the 
objection of the Comptons and their counsel. Plaintiff's 
counsel, in discussions with ComptonsT counsel and an officer of 
the title company, was made aware that the sale to the Joneses, 
who were innocent third parties and who had already moved into 
the family home, could not be completed under the cloud upon 
title to the home created by PlaintiffTs Notice of Lien. 
Plaintiff's counsel further knew that there was substantially 
more secured debt owing on the home than the sales price and fair 
market value of the property and that the sale had been 
facilitated by the agreement of the secured lender to discount 
its payoff by more than $8000.00. If the sale was delayed 
further by Plaintiff's refusal to remove the cloud on the title, 
then the lender would refuse to accept a discounted payoff and 
the foreclosure proceedings already pending by the secured lender 
would be completed, resulting in a total loss of any proceeds to 
Edwin Compton or his wife, Debra Compton. 
The action and conduct of Plaintiff's counsel in this 
regard clearly demonstrates a lack of good faith and an attempt 
to take unconscionable advantage of the Comptons under the 
circumstances. The Honorable Judge Page, at the conclusion of 
the trial, saw fit to reprimand Plaintiff's counsel for the 
tactics used in obtaining the entirety of the sales proceeds. 
However, the Judge erroneously concluded that the Utah statutes 
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did not permit him to award attorney's fees. Justice would not 
be done by this Court if it does not reverse Judge PageTs 
erroneous conclusion and, at the very least, award Edwin Compton 
attorney's fees pursuant to Section 78-27-56 U.C.A. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial courtTs decision to permit the judgment in 
favor of Debra Compton for recovery of exempt homestead sale 
proceeds to be setoff against Plaintiff's prior judgment and 
thereby to permit Plaintiff to retain the exempt proceeds must be 
reversed and remanded with instructions to enter judgment in 
favor of Debra Compton permitting her the recovery of her exempt 
homestead proceeds and allowing her the receipt of such proceeds 
for a period of one year before the same would be subject to levy 
or execution by Plaintiff or any other creditor. 
The decision of the trial court interpreting Section 78-
23-13 U.C.A. as available for a recovery of attorney's fees only 
under circumstances involving wrongful execution is erroneous and 
should be reversed and remanded with instructions to take 
evidence respecting attorney's fees necessarily incurred and 
occasioned by Plaintiff's wrongful refusal to return the exempt 
sale proceeds and enter judgment accordingly. 
Finally, the trial court's failure to award the Compton's 
attorney's fees under Section 78-27-56 U.C.A. was based on an 
23 
erroneous conclusion that Plaintiff's defense was not without 
merit in view of the fact that Plaintiff's counsel acknowledged, 
even prior to taking the sale proceeds, that such proceeds were 
at all times owned by Edwin Compton who was not at any time a 
judgment debtor of Plaintiff. 
DATED this 14th day of September, 1987. 
^><^BENSON MAKOT ' / ' ' / L 
MURPHY, TOLBOE & MABEY 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Appellants 
370 East 500 South, Suite 2 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 533-8505 
State Bar Number: A2035 
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IN THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
FREED LEASING, INC., ) 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
DEBRA K. COMPTON and \ 
EDWIN COMPTON, ] 
Defendants. ) 
i STIPULATION OF FACTS 
I Civil No. 35898 
William R, Russell, co-counsel of record for Plaintiff, 
and L. Benson Mabey, counsel of record for Defendants and 
Counterclaimants, make and enter into the following Stipulation 
of Facts to present to the Court: 
STIPULATED FACTS 
1. On or about April, 1980, Debra and her husband, 
Edwin Compton, purchased a single family home located at 1097 
South 800 East, Bountiful, Utah, described more particularly as 
FILMED 
2 
Lot 12, Holbrook Heights, Plat "A", Davis County, State of Utah 
(the "subject property"). Debra and Edwin Compton acquired 
title to this property as joint tenants. 
2. On or about April 23, 1984, Plaintiff recovered 
judgment against Defendant Debra K. Compton in the sum of 
$8905.38 in the Third District Court of Salt Lake County, State 
of Utah. Such judgment arose out of an automobile lease 
between Plaintiff and Defendant Debra K. Compton. 
3. On or about June 29, 1984, Debra Compton conveyed 
her interest in the subject property to her husband, Edwin 
Compton, by quit claim deed. At this time of this conveyance 
by quit claim deed to Edwin, Debra, Edwin and their minor 
child, Jeremey, age 5, were living in the house on the subject 
property and continued to live in the house after the quit 
claim deed conveyance. 
4. At the time Debra conveyed her interest in the 
subject property to Edwin, and thereafter to August 10, 1984, 
the subject property had a fair market value of $122,000.00 and 
was subject to first and second trust deed obligations with an 
aggregate balance of not less than $120,000.00 (copy of title 
report appended). 
5. The purported quit claim deed conveyance by Debra 
to her husband Edwin was made without fair consideration within 
the meaning of Title 25 of the Utah Code, was made by Debra 
while she was insolvent or the conveyance rendered her 
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insolvent within the meaning of Title 25 of the Utah Code, and 
was made by her to avoid the attachment of Plaintifffs judgment 
lien to the subject property. 
6. On or about July of 1984, Edwin entered into a 
written agreement to sell the subject property to R.T. Jones 
and Nanna E. Jones for the price of $122,000.00. The sales 
agreement between Edwin and the Joneses was negotiated in an 
arms-length transaction. The sales price of $122,000.00 was 
the highest and best sales price that had been offered for the 
property after the property had been actively exposed to the 
marketplace for a reasonable length of time. 
7. Prior to August 1, 1984, Comptons moved all of 
their personal property, including household furnishings out of 
their house and permitted the Joneses to enter into possession. 
8. On or about the 27th day of July, 1984, Plaintiff 
filed this action against both Debra and Edwin Compton alleging 
that a default judgment had been taken against Debra Compton on 
or about April 23, 1984 in Salt Lake County and seeking that 
Comptons be restrained from encumbering, transferring or 
conveying the subject property to allow Plaintiff to conduct 
execution proceedings thereon to satisfy its judgment. 
9. On the 1st day of August, 1984, Edwin Compton and 
Joneses closed the sale of the subject property by signing and 
depositing all the necessary documents, including the Warranty 
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Deed conveying the property to Jonses with Associated Title 
Company. 
10. On August 1, 1984, Gary Phillips, an employee of 
Associated Title Company, presented the warranty deed and other 
documents for recording to complete the conveyance of the 
subject property. At this time, Mr. Phillips first discovered 
that Plaintiff had caused a Notice of Lien to be recorded 
August 1, 1984 with the office of the Davis County Recorder 
specifically describing the subject property and claiming that 
Plaintiff had a lien against Debra Compton's interest in the 
subject property (copy appended). 
11. Mr. Phillips immediately advised the Comptons and 
the Joneses that the Notice of Lien rendered the title 
unmarketable and uninsurable and that the transaction could not 
be completed because of the Notice of Lien and he could not 
record the Warranty Deed to the Jonses because the same had 
been delivered for the express purpose and subject to the 
condition that title would be marketable in the Jonses. 
12. On the 3rd of August, 1984, L. Benson Mabey, 
attorney for Defendant Debra Compton, advised Plaintiff's 
attorney, Stephen L. Johnston, by letter (copy appended) and by 
phone conversation, that the total net sale proceeds that would 
be paid to Edwin Compton, as seller, from the sale of the 
subject property would be in the amount of $1517.98 and that 
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Defendant Debra Compton was entitled to and claimed a Homestead 
Exemption in the subject property of $10,500.00. Mr. Mabey 
provided Plaintiff's counsel, Mr. Johnston, with a copy of the 
proposed Homestead Declaration and sellerfs and purchaser's 
settlement statements (copies appended) to verify the net sale 
proceeds resulting from the sale. 
13. On the 6th of August, 1984, Mr. Mabey, Mr. 
Johnston and Mr. Phillips of Associated Title Company had a 
conversation for the purpose of substantiating the seller's and 
purchaser's settlement statements to verify the net sale 
proceeds which would result from the sale. During this 
conversation, Mr. Phillips advised Mr. Johnston and Mr. Mabey 
that one of the holders of a secured encumbrance against the 
subject property had agreed to discount its payoff balance by 
approximately $8000.00 to accomodate and facilitate the 
completion of the sales transaction whereby such holder would 
be paid off at the discounted balance set forth on the seller's 
s e 111emen t s t a t emen t. 
14. Mr. Mabey advised Mr. Johnston during this 
conversation, that if the closing was delayed further by reason 
of the Notice of Lien, the discounted payoff balance would no 
longer be accepted by the holder and the sale could not then be 
completed, causing damage and detriment to Edwin Compton and to 
the purchasers (Joneses) who had no notice or knowledge prior 
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to August 1, 1984 of any purported claim of Plaintiff to a lien 
on the subject property. 
15. During this discussion, Mr. Mabey offered to enter 
into a stipulation to hold the net sales proceeds of $1517.98 
in escrow at Associated Title Company for the purpose of 
preserving and protecting Plaintiff's claim until the Court 
could make a determination as to the interest of the parties in 
such proceeds. Plaintiff's counsel refused to release the lien 
or to accept any escrow of the funds. 
16. In subsequent telephone conversations between 
Plaintiff's counsel and Mr. Mabey, Plaintiff's counsel said 
that he understood that Edwin Compton was at all times since 
the purchase of the property, at least a one-half owner of the 
property and was not a party to the action or judgment 
previously taken by Plaintiff against the Defendant Debra 
Compton. Nevertheless, Plaintiff's counsel refused to accept a 
tender of one-half of the net proceeds and instead insisted on 
$2500.00, approximately $1000.00 more than the net sale 
proceeds, as a pre-condition to the release of the lien and 
clearance of the cloud upon the title of the subject property. 
17. On August 9, 1984, Associated Title Company 
received a letter from Plaintiff stating that upon receipt of 
the entire net sales proceeds of $1517.98, Plaintiff would give 
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Associated a release of lien and indemnify Associated 
respecting the lien (copy appended to this Stipulation). 
18. On August 9, 1984, Defendant Debra K. Compton 
recorded the Declaration of Homestead Exemption (copy of which 
is appended) and instructed Associated to record the Warranty 
Deed to purchasers (Warranty deed recorded August 10, 1984, a 
copy of which is appended) and to release the sale proceeds to 
Plaintiff. The Declaration of Homestead was recorded prior to 
the Warranty Deed to purchasers and the $1517.98 was paid by 
Associated Title Company to Plaintiff. 
19. On or about August 29, 1984, Defendants filed 
their answer and counterclaim against Plaintiff. 
20. The check paid from Associated Title Company for 
the total sale proceeds in the amount of $1517.98 was paid to 
Plaintiff on August 11, 1984 and the interest on such amount, 
at the implied rate under Utah law (10%) per annum, from such 
date to March 26, 1987 (a total of 958 days) is in the amount 
of $398.42. 
DATED th day of . 1987. 
MfUl 
William R. Russell 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
hy awreron Mattey 
Attorney for Defendants 
Form 1756-A 
Commitment. Scn«duf« A 
SCHEDULE A 
1. Effective Date: July 11 , 1984, at 8:00 A.M. Commitment No: D-84-6230 
2. Policy or Policies to be issued: Amount 
(a) Q ALTA Owner's Policy $120,000.00-$495.00 
Proposed Insured: R. KEITH JONES and NONNA E . JONES 
(b) Q ALTA Loan Policy $ 40,300.00-$120.00 
Proposed Insured: GIBRALTAR MDNEY CENTER 
(O • $ 
3. Tne estate or interest in the land described or referred to in this commitment and covered herein is fee simple and 
title thereto is at the effective date hereof vested in: 
EDWIN E. COMPTON, as his sole and separate property 
4. The land referred to in this commitment is situated in the County of Davis, State of 
Utah, and is described as follows: 
All of Lot 12, HOLBROOK HEIGHTS PLAT "A", according to the official 
plat thereof, on file and of record in the Davis County Recorder's 
Office. 
Property Address: 1097 South 800 East, Bountiful, Utah 84010 
Dimensions: 80' X 141.97' X 84.98* X 113.29' 
Form 1756 - B1 
Commitment, Schedule B-1 
SCHEDULE B-Section 1 No. D H 
Requirements 
The following are the requirements to be complied with: 
Item (a) Payment to or for the account of the grantors or mortgagors of the full consideration for the estate or 
interest to be insured. 
Item (b) Proper instrument(s) creating the estate or interest to be insured must be executed and duly filed for 
record, to-wit: 
Item (c) Trust Deed or Mortgage executed by R. KEITH JONES and NONNA E. JONES, 
to secure your loan. 
Fo 56 - B2 (Revised July, 1972 
Com ..tment. Schedule B-2 
SCHEDULE B - Section 2 No. D-84-6230 
Exceptions 
The policy or policies to be issued will contain exceptions to the following unless the same are disposed of to the 
satisfaction of the Company. 
1. Taxes or assessments wmcn are not snown as existing hens by the records of any taxing authority that levies 
taxes or assessments on real property or by the public records. 
2. Any facts, rights, interests, or claims which are not shown by the public records but which could be ascertained 
by an inspection of said land or by making inquiry of persons in possession thereof. 
3. Easements, claims of easement or encumbrances which are not shown by the public records. 
4. Discrepancies, conflicts in boundary lines, shortage in area, encroachments, or any other facts which a correct 
survey would disclose, and which are not shown by public records. 
5. Unpatented mining claims; reservations or exceptions in patents or in Acts authorizing the issuance thereof, 
water rights, claims or title to water. 
6. Any lien, or right to a lien, for services, labor or material theretofore or hereafter furnished, imposed by law 
and not shown by the public records. 
7. Defects, liens, encumbrances, adverse claims or other matters, if any, created, first appearing in the public rec-
ords or attaching subsequent to the effective date hereof but prior to the date the proposed insured acquires 
of record for value the estate or interest or mortgage thereon covered by this commitment. 
8. All assessments and taxes for the year 1984, and thereafter. Taxes for the 
year 1983 have been paid in the amount of $1,078.00. (Serial No. 04-094-0012) 
9. Trust Deed in the amount of $70,000.00, dated April 2, 1980, executed in 
favor of UTAH MORTGAGE LOAN CORPORATION, a Utah Corporation, as Beneficiary, 
by EDWIN E. C0MPT0N and DEBRA K. C0MPT0N, husband and wife, as Trustor, with 
INTERWEST TITLE COMPANY, as Trustee, recorded April 2, 1980, as Entry No. 
561708, in Book 819, at Page 771, Davis County Recorder's Office. 
Assigned to FEDERAL NATIONAL MORTGAGE ASSOCIATION, by Assignment of Trust Deed 
dated April 25, 1980, recorded May 6, 1980, as Entry No. 564196, in Book 823, 
at Page 733, Davis County Recorder1s Office. 
10. Substitution of Trustee, dated January 19, 1984, wherein DOUGLAS MATSUMORI, 
a member of the Utah State Bar Association, is the duly appointed and substituted 
Trustee, under the above Trust Deed, by document recorded January 26, 1984, 
as Entry No. 662917, in Book 976, at Page 589, Davis County Recorder's Office. 
11. Notice of Default, wherein DOUGLAS MATSUMORI, Successor Trustee, provides notice 
that Trustor is in default under Trust Deed shown as Exception No. 9 herein, and 
the Successor Trustee has elected and does hereby elect to sell or cause to be 
sold the subject property, recorded January 26, 1984, as Entry No. 662918, 
in Book 976, at Page 590, Davis County Recorder's Office. 
Continued. 
UU^Y 
Exceptions numbered none »"• hereby omitted. 
Commitment No. D-84-6230 
Schedule B-Secton 2, Page 2. 
12. Substitution of Trustee, dated May 9, 1984, wherein DOUGLAS MATSUMORI, a 
member of the Utah State Bar Association, is the duly appointed and substituted 
Trustee, under the above Trust Deed, by document recorded May 18, 1984, as 
Entry No. 672367, in Book 990, at Page 866, Davis County Recorder's Office. 
13. Notice of Default, wherein DOUGLAS MATSUMORI, Successor Trustee, provides notice 
that Trustor is in default under Trust Deed shown as Exception No. 9 herein, and 
the Successor Trustee has elected and does hereby elect to sell or cause to 
be sold the subject property, recorded May 18, 1984, as Entry No. 672368, 
in Book 990, at Page 867, Davis County Recorder's Office, re-recorded June 5, 
1984, as Entry No. 674002, in Book 993, at Page 5, Davis County Recorder's 
Office. 
14. Trust Deed in the amount of $23,000.00, dated September 14, 1982, executed in 
favor of NORTHWEST CREDIT UNION, as Beneficiary, by EDWIN E. COMPTON and DEBRA 
K. COMPTON, as Trustor, with UTAH TITLE AND ABSTRACT COMPANY, as Trustee, 
recorded September 16, 1982, as Entry No. 622958, in Book 914, at Page 936, 
Davis County Recorder's Office. 
15. Trust Deed in the amount of $42,494.92, dated September 12, 1983, executed in 
favor of FIDELITY FINANCIAL SERVICES, as Beneficiary, by EDWIN E. COMPTON and 
DEBRA K. COMPTON, his wife, as Trustor, with RECORD TITLE AGENCY OF UTAH INC., 
as Trustee, recorded September 16, 1983, as Entry No. 651946, in Book 959, 
at Page 903, Davis County Recorder's Office. 
16. A seven (7) foot easement for public utilities running along the Northeasterly 
and Southwesterly sides of the subject property as shown on the recorded 
plat of said subdivision. 
17. Said property is located within the boundaries of the Weber Basin Water Conservancy 
District, Bountiful Water Subconservancy District, South Davis Sewer Improvement 
District, and Bountiful City (298-6194), and is subject to the charges and 
assessments levied thereunder. 
Note: The following name(s) have been checked for judgments: 
1. JONES, R. Keith 
2. JONES, Nonna E. 
3. COMPTON, Edwin E. 
4. COMPTON, Debra K. 
No unsatisfied judgments have been filed during the past eight years-
f phen L. Johnst 
Lawyer 
633 West 500 North 
P.O. Box 16141 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84116 
801-364-7320 COPY 
679052 IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR DAVIS COUNTY STATE OF UTAH 
FREED LEASING, INC., 328 H W 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DEBRA K. COMPTON, 
Defendant. 
a pf 
NOTICE OF LIEN OF FREED 
LEASING INC. AGAINST ALL 
INTERESTS IN REAL PROPERTY 
LOCATED IN DAVIS COUNTY OF 
DEBRA K. COMPTON 
CASE NO. C—84-405 — 
License No. 1730 
Please take notice that Freed Leasing Inc. has a lien 
against all interests in real property of Debra K. Compton by 
QJ to 




Lake County and docketed with the clerk of Davis County. The 
judgment was rendered in Salt Lake County on 23 April 1984 and 
"5> £ docketed in Davis County on 18 July 1984. The judgment was en-
c5 « 
S £ tered in the sum of Eighty-Nine Hundred and Five Dollars and 
c o 
° ° Thirty-Eight Cents ($8,905.38). This lien should be entered 
against Debra K. Compton's interest in the following described 
real property, ^ 0 ^ . 0 0 | J L 
Lot 12, Holbrook Heights, Plat A 
The lien should be entered against any other interests 
tate owned by Debra K. Compton in Davis County, 
ted this nfWl^&ay of July 1984, 
BMJLU Stephten Le Johnston 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
YANO, MURPHY, WEGGELAND ANO FRIEDLAND, RC. 
A T T O R N E Y S A T L A W 
37C CAST 4TM SOUTH STHCCT, SUiTC 3 0 0 
SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH 8*111 
A»»~* . «* • 0 1 QO A 
Stephen L. Johnston 
Attorney at Law 
633 West 500 North 
P.O. Box 16141 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84116 
RE: Freed Leasing Inc. vs Debra Compton and Edwin 
Compton — Case No. C-84-605 
Dear Mr.Johnston: 
I tried to get a hold of you on Thursday and Friday 
without success. I am representing Debra Compton in connection 
with the complaint that you have filed in Davis County seeking to 
set aside a purported Quit Claim conveyance by Debra Compton to 
Edwin Compton, her husband, of the home at 1097 South 800 East in 
Bountiful, Utah. 
In this regard, I have enclosed a copy of the closing 
statement that was signed a few days ago for the sale of the 
subject home (both buyer and seller statements are enclosed). I 
have also enclosed a copy of a Declaration of Homestead that Ms. 
Compton will sign and file to claim an exemption for the subject 
property. 
If you will review the seller's settlement statement, you 
will readily see that the total sale proceeds are in the amount 
of $1517.98 and that Ms. Compton would be entitled, under Section 
78-23-3, Utah Code, et seq., to claim $10,500.00 on Homestead 
Exemption for this property. I understand the reason for your 
action to set aside the Quit Claim Deed as a fraudulent 
conveyance, but as you can see, even if it were set aside, there 
would still be no proceeds available for your client from the 
sale of the home. If you will review Section 78-23-3, 
particularly (5) and Section 78-23-4, then I believe that you 
will agree that your notice of lien recorded August 1, 1984 
should be voluntarily removed from the County Recorder's records 
to permit the completion of the sale transaction. 
Stephen L. Johnston 
August 3, 1984 
Page 2 
Please give this your inmediate consideration and 
telephone me as soon as possible so that we can discuss this 
matter. Thanks for your anticipated cooperation. 
LBM/js 
Encl • 
cc Debra Compton 
fi; (tUPf 
ASSOCIATED TITLE COMPANY 
EDWIN E. COMPTON 
BUYERS SETTLEMENT STATEMENT 
R. KEITH JONES 
SELLERS 
Property 1097 South 800 East 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
NONNA E. JONES 
BUYERS 
Escrow N„mhpr D-84-6230 
DEBITS: 
Sales Price 
Unexpired Fire Insurance with. 
Reserves FIRST SECURITY REALTY SERVICES 
Recording F ~ WARRANTY DEED 
Escrow P~ ASSOCIATED TITLE COMPANY 
Loan Transfer P*> FIRST SECURITY REALTY SERVICES 
Other Debits: 
RESERVE DEFICIT TO FIRST SECURITY REALTY SERVICES 
STATE FARM INSURANCE HOMEOWNERS 




















, 4 . 4 7 
LESS CREDITS: 
Tax Pro-ration to . 8 - 1 - 8 4 Based on 1 9 2 1 _ taxes in the 
amount of < 1 . 0 7 8 , 0 0 Tax Serial * 04 -094 -0012 
Earnest Money Deposit With CHRISTIANSEN REALTORS 
TRUST DEED balance as nf 8 -1 -84 with 
UTAH MORTGAGE & LOAN 
Interest due and assumed by buyer 










6 2 3 . 0 3 
1 - 0 0 0 . 0 0 
6Q_022.7ft 
TOTAL CREDITS.. 
NET AMOUNT REQUIRED FROM BUYER TO CLOSE... 
t 70.645.81 
53,096.61 
The undersigned hereby accept the above information at true and correct and do hereby hold Associated Title Company 
harmless and free of any liability resulting from different information or amounts described herein which is later deemed 





BuyerSonna Jkt Jones 
ASSOCIATED TITLE COMPANY 
SELLERS SETTLEMENT STATEMENT 
^yrr 
EDWIN E. COMPTON R. KFTTH JONES 
SELLERS 
NOMMA V 1HKVQ 
Prn^ rtx/ 1097 South 800 East 





Unexpired Fire Insurance with. 
Reserves FIRST SECURITY KFAT.TY SFBVTPFS 











Tax Proration to 8 - 1 - 8 4 .based on 1 9 J H taxes in the 
amount of * K Q 7 8 . 0 0 
TRUST DEED 
with UTAH WORTgAgg LOAN 
_ T n Serial m 0 4 - 0 9 4 - 0 0 1 2 
. balance as of 8 - 1 - 8 4 
Title ln<urang« ASSOCIATED TTTT.F COMPANY 
Recording P»~ RECON^RECON^ POWER OF ATTORNEY 
Commission f w CHRISTIANSEN/PETER WIMBROW 
Earnest Money deposit with« 
Escrow Pee ASSOCIATED TTTLE COMPANY 
Interest due 9r\d tssumed by buyer from 
Other D e d u c t i o n s : _ _ _ 
- to . 
DpHnqnpnr Payments July R3 August R4 
Attorney Fees 
Fayott Fidelity Financial 
TOTAL DEDUCTIONS... , 
























S 1 2 1 , 0 9 9 , 0 ^ 
< 1.517.98 
The undersigned hereby accept the above information at true and correct and do hereby hold Associated Title Company 
harmless and free of any liability resulting from different information or amounts described herein which is later deemed 
incorrect. AH instruments may be delivered or recorded and funds disbursed in accordance herewith. 
Dated . ^ W f/ 
~ , 'Edwin E^Coxnptpn 
Closing OMIctr - U j £ * V » t f W _ */*\J d*A<<Xj 
Seller* New Addreee 
6 7 r ^ n o X ^ ^ ^ T T Cryy 
, ' i  m t  
EXHIBIT "A" 
August 9, 1984 
To: Associated Title Company 
811 South 500 West 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
Re: ATC D-84-6230 
From: Freed Leasing, Inc. 
47 South 200 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Re: Notice of Lien of Freed Leasing Inc. against all interests in real 
property located in Davis County of Debra K. Compton. 
To Whom It May Concern: 
The undersigned hereby agrees that upon receipt of $1,517.98, representing 
sellers equity in the property located at 1097 South 800 East, Bountiful, 
Utah, that they will indemnify and hold harmless from any loss and/or expense 
Associated Title Company, their underwriter and escrow officers, pertinent to 
a Notice of Lien dated July 27, 1984, and recorded August 1, 1984, as Entry 
No. 679052, in Book 1000, at Page 617, Davis County Recorder's Office, and 
further agrees to furnish a complete Release of Lien showing full satisfaction 
of said lien pertinent to the subject property. 
Property is also known as: 
All of Lot 12, H0LBR00K HEIGHTS, PLAT "A", according to the 
official plat thereof on file and of record in the Davis County 
Recorder's Office. 
Dated this 9th day of August, 1984. 
Attest: 
FREED LEASING, INC. / 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
J 
Its: /,. I^-J 
On the / '/? day of August, 1984, personally appeared before me 
_ _ _ and , who being by me 
duly sworn did say, each for himself, that he, the said 
is the , and he, the said , is the 
of Freed Leasing, Inc. and that the within and foregoing 
instrument was signed in behalf of said corporation by authority of a resolution 
of its board of directors and said and __ 
each duly acknowledged to me that said corporation executed the same. 
